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Two years have passed since the 2016 election of Donald J. Trump, and 
U.S. social work is revisiting its radical stirrings and grappling with 
its conservative moorings. In this paper, I will argue that as U.S. so-
cial work appraises the adequacy of its intellectual leaders, the cultural 
relevance of its practice models, and its stance toward the Enlighten-
ment ideals of reason, truth, and justice, it might usefully re-examine 
its relationship to the critical theory legacy of the Frankfurt School, 
especially the thinking of Jürgen Habermas. My goal in this essay is 
to suggest ways in which Habermasian thinking could provide social 
work more viable solutions than those offered by the idea of neoliberal 
governmentality.
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Introduction: Social Work and Critical Theory
 In light of twin impulses now sweeping the globe—the ex‐
pansion of human rights in some places, the retrenchment of 
nationalism in others—U.S. social work is revisiting its radical 
stirrings and grappling with its conservative moorings. At a 
moment in which U.S. social work is both celebrated and vili‐
fied for embracing positivism in its structural equation models 
and managerialism in its tightly constricted educational com‐
petencies, the profession faces great, if not grand, challenges 
(American Academy of Social Work and Social Welfare, 2019). 
Not least among these challenges is social work’s coherent and 
long-term response to the peculiarly American brand of nativ‐
ism and corporate oligarchy potentiated by the 2016 election. 
 In this paper, I will argue that as U.S. social work appraises 
the adequacy of its intellectual leaders, the cultural relevance 
of its practice models, and its stance toward the Enlightenment 
ideals of reason, truth, and justice, it might usefully re-exam‐
ine its relationship to the critical theory legacy of the Frankfurt 
School, especially the thinking of Jürgen Habermas. My goal in 
this essay is to suggest ways in which Habermasian thinking 
could provide social work a conceptual atoll in a rising sea of 
neoliberalism, professionalization, and criminalization (Meh‐
rotra, Kimball, & Wahab, 2016). 
The Critical Theory Legacy of the Frankfurt School
 Before they were forced by Nazis in 1933 to close the Marx‐
ist Institute for Social Research (Institut für Sozialforschung) in 
Frankfurt, first generation critical theorists Max Horkheimer, 
Theodor Adorno, Herbert Marcuse, Walter Benjamin, Friedrich 
Pollock, Leo Lowenthal, and Eric Fromm wrote widely against 
Nazism in Germany, fascism in Europe, and Stalinism in Rus‐
sia. Under the leadership of Max Horkheimer, Frankfurt School 
theorists reinterpreted classical Marxist philosophy, giving 
greater weight than Marx to the role and function of ideology 
(the ”superstructure“) vis-a-vis materialist forces of production 
(the ”base“). Perhaps best known among the Frankfurt School 
in the U.S. were Horkheimer and Adorno, whose incendiary 
Dialectic of Enlightenment (1944) indicted “the culture industry” 
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they observed after fleeing Germany and taking up residence 
near Los Angeles, California. 
 On the whole, the Frankfurt School’s first generation de‐
nounced the unanticipated consequences of modernity—the 
violent deployment of technology, the calculating and bureau‐
cratic contortion of Enlightenment reason, and the licentious 
exploitation of workers under increasingly veiled forms of cap‐
italist production. Since the 1940s, several generations of criti‐
cal theorists have built upon and modernized the ideas of the 
Frankfurt School. These include Jürgen Habermas, leader of the 
second generation, who carried on the school’s legacy in an era 
deeply preoccupied with the radical democratization of society 
through social movements. 
 Because Habermas is concerned with democratic engage‐
ment, his thinking has been taken up by social work scholars 
in the last 25 years. Notable examples include Henkel’s (1995) 
caution about the danger of an “aspiration to consensus” in 
the Habermasian ideal speech situation; Blaug’s (1995) concern 
about colonization in social work communication; Ashenden’s 
(2004) use of Habermas to understand “crises of legitimation” 
in child welfare practice in the UK; and Houston’s summative 
review of key Habermasian concepts (2013). 
 Like Freud, whose ideas traversed the Enlightenment and 
Romantic eras, Habermas is something of a transitional figure 
between modernity and postmodernity. With Marx, Weber, and 
Marcuse, Habermas shares a critique of technical or instrumen‐
tal rationality, positivism, bureaucracy, capitalism, ideology, and 
domination. With Foucault, Lacan, and Derrida, Habermas rec‐
ognizes the importance of language and meaning-making. What 
distinguishes Habermas from classical and contemporary social 
theorists alike is that he retains a belief in political consensus 
forged on the basis of collectively negotiated and legitimated val‐
ues. In short, Habermas seeks to salvage the Enlightenment proj‐
ect—human emancipation through reason, law, and justice—by 
wresting reason from the lair of the technical and bureaucratic 
and uniting it with language and the realm of sensual, interpre‐
tive, lived experience. In my view, Habermas’ reconciliation of 
Enlightenment reason and postfoundational critique could offer 
social work practical and conceptual strategies for resisting re‐
pression within and beyond the profession. 
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 To sharpen the contours of Habermas’ thinking, I first com‐
pare and contrast his views with those of Foucault, Marx, We‐
ber, Marcuse, and with contemporary theorist Wendy Brown. 
After a brief review of foundational theories culminating in the 
Foucauldian idea of governmentality, I take up three of Haber‐
mases’ ideas—system and lifeworld, legitimation crisis, and commu-
nicative action—and argue that these ideas could enliven social 
work’s response to the global phenomenon of neoliberal ratio‐
nality. 
Review: Structuralism vs. Poststructuralism
 Although social work has incorporated “critical theory” into 
its lexicon (Fook, 2003; Healy, 2001; Pease & Fook, 1999), some 
scholars have lamented the imprecision with which this term 
is used. For example, Gray and Webb (2009) have characterized 
some critical social work as “largely impressionistic, with the 
[use] of the term ‘critical’ being casual and loose” (p. 78). It is 
fair to say that critical social work has struggled to reconcile, in 
the words of Wendy Brown (2016), an “indispensable but non‐
trivial incongruence in the formulations of power, of agency, of 
truth, and of historical change” between theories that derive 
from Marxist vs. Foucauldian thinking. 
 To her credit, Jan Fook acknowledged in early work that at‐
tempts to unite “structural” and “poststructural” perspectives 
under the banner “postmodern critical social work” (Pease & 
Fook, 1999) were fraught with epistemological and methodolog‐
ical challenges:
[C]urrently it is possible to identify two major perspectives 
in critical social work that can roughly be differentiated as 
the structural and poststructural. In broad terms the former 
is based on Marxist analysis…emphasizing the role of social 
structure in the determination of class and power differenc‐
es. The latter approach tends to incorporate more Foucauldian 
analysis…which involves recognizing more personal, dynam‐
ic, and multiple ways in which power differences are created 
and maintained…[I]t is worthwhile noting that each perspec‐
tive entails quite divergent implications regarding the nature 
of knowledge and knowledge creation. (2003, p. 125)
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As Habermas occupies a territory between structuralism and 
poststructuralism, and as these terms continue to create more 
confusion than clarity, these divergent implications deserve 
further scrutiny. First, we must consider whether Marx and 
Foucault merit these characterizations at all. 
Structuralism
 To begin, Foucault’s analyses of the origins of modern med‐
icine, psychiatry, and systems of classification in The Birth of the 
Clinic (1963/1973), The Order of Things (1966/1970), and The Ar-
cheaology of Knowledge (1969/1972), though widely debated, are 
often considered “high structuralist” (Elliot, 2009). Although 
they are unwilling to call Foucault a structuralist, Dreyfus and 
Rabinow allow that Foucault’s attempt in the The Birth of the 
Clinic “to find the silent structure which sustains practices, dis‐
course, perceptual experience (the gaze), as well as the knowing 
subject and its objects” indeed “represents Foucault’s extreme 
swing towards structuralism” (1983, p. 15). Thus, Foucault’s ear‐
ly work can perhaps be considered “holistically” versus “atom‐
istically” structuralist (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983).
 Within social theory, structuralism per se is typically as‐
sociated with de Saussure and later Barthes and Levi-Strauss, 
whose work sought to examine the linguistic rules governing 
language and speech (or food, or fashion). In Fook’s quote, 
above, Marxist analysis is considered structuralist, but main‐
ly in opposition to poststructuralist. This is an ironic conceit 
a la Saussure, who maintained that meaning is always forged 
through the difference or opposition between signifiers. 
 In this case, the immense impact of cultural studies, which 
retooled essentialist and vanguardist Marxist assumptions 
about power, agency, truth, and historical change (cf. Gross‐
berg, Nelson, & Treichler, 1993; Hall, Held, Hubert, & Thomp‐
son, 1996) and achieved a durable, nuanced, and historical ma‐
terialist but postfoundational version of Marxism, is ignored. 
Having said that, it is important to acknowledge that French 
post-Marxism made important contributions to structural 
Marxism, notably, the idea that the state rather than the bour‐
geoisie reproduces capitalism in its legal, economic, and polit‐
ical institutions or “ideological state apparatuses” (Althusser, 
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1971). In sum, Marxism is not a monolithic category belonging 
exclusively to the domain of structuralism, nor is Foucault ex‐
clusively a poststructuralist.
Poststructuralism
 Moving on with amplification of the structural/post-struc‐
tural binary, poststructuralism is typically associated with the 
continental philosophy of Lacan, Derrida, Kristeva and oth‐
ers who pushed the limits of structuralism by questioning the 
immediacy of meaning inherent in sign-signifier pairings. As 
Anthony Elliot (2009) describes succinctly, Lacan argued that 
meaning is always suspended, whereas Derrida argued that the 
“absence of the transcendental signified extends the domain 
and the play of signification indefinitely,” (p. 92). In other words, 
meaning derives from a potentially eternal play of signs and 
signifiers and extends beyond the closed and purportedly sta‐
ble system of sign-signifier proposed by structuralism to wider 
political and cultural social phenomena like gender and race. 
 In the past 30 years, variations of deconstruction have been 
taken up widely by feminist, queer, and postcolonial scholars 
to reveal the latent contradictions present in unstable signifiers 
like “woman,” for example. In the process, scholars too numer‐
ous to cite have followed on early attempts to de-center cate‐
gories like identity and nationality (Bhabha, 1994); the colonial 
subject (Spivak, 1988); and gender (Butler, 1990, 1991, 1993, 2004; 
Cixous, 1981).
 Returning for a moment to the characterization of Fou‐
cault’s concept of power as “personal” in the above quote about 
critical social work, one might argue that Marx rather than Fou‐
cault entertained something akin to notion of personal power 
in the 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte: “Men [sic] make their 
own history, but they do not make it as they please; they do 
not make it under self-selected circumstances, but under cir‐
cumstances existing already, given and transmitted from the 
past” (Marx, 1852, p. 6). In this sentiment, Marx both grants and 
checks individual agency against the historical materialist forc‐
es of production. To the contrary, and this is central to my argu‐
ment against neoliberal governmentality, while Foucault’s idea 
of governmentality describes “the ways in which one might 
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be urged and educated to bridle one’s own passions, to control 
one’s own instincts, to govern oneself” (Rose, 1999, p. 3), his re‐
liance on discourse diminishes human agency. 
 As Elliot maintains about Foucault’s theory of sexuality, 
perhaps Foucault’s most poststructural work, 
[I]t is discourse which produces human experience rather 
than experience (individual dispositions, emotional desires, 
personal biographies) producing discourse. The strength of 
Foucault’s position is that he underlines the extent to which 
individuals, in defining themselves as sexual subjects, be‐
come fixed in relation to symbolic discourses and social pro‐
hibitions. The making of sexual identities, says Foucault, is al‐
ways interwoven with a mode of social control. However, the 
weakness of this standpoint is that it bypasses the complexity 
of individual agency. Thus, Foucault’s work often implies a 
one-way movement of power over and above the individual. 
(2009, p. 86)
Although the notion of capillary power for which Foucault has 
become known may suggest a kind of personal power, it would 
perhaps be more accurate to say that Foucault’s rendering of 
power is more nuanced and less unidirectionally freighted than 
structural-functionalist versions of power. However, it is a ver‐
sion of power nonetheless constrained by discourse, which I 
will argue limits its utility for praxis. 
Habermas’ Contributions to Critical Theory 
Rational or Instrumental Action 
 To understand Habermas’ conceptual revision to classical 
social theory, we must first review the notion of rational or 
instrumental action—that is, action undertaken explicitly to 
reach a desired end. As Habermas (1987) argues in Theory of 
Communicative Action, Durkheim, Marx, and Weber, to varying 
degrees, ignore or misconstrue potential sources of liberation 
and mass resistance in late modernity, as against “traditional,” 
pre-industrial society. 
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The counter-Enlightenment that set in immediately after the 
French Revolution grounded a critique of modernity that 
has since branched off in different directions. Their common 
denominator is the conviction that loss of meaning [Weber], 
anomie [Durkheim], and alienation [Marx]—the pathologies 
of bourgeois society, indeed of posttraditional society gener‐
ally—can be traced back to the rationalization of the lifeworld 
itself. (p. 148)
 According to Habermas, orthodox Marxism subsumed rea‐
son within instrumental action, dismissing any emancipatory 
potential it offered. Moreover, historical materialism relegated 
all liberation to the realm of material production, thereby ig‐
noring the role of the lifeworld, a concept to which I will return. 
Similarly, Durkheim lamented the loss of cohesion in anomic 
(post-traditional) society, but he underestimated the role that 
reason could play in negotiating shared meaning and values. 
And finally, according to Habermas, Weber conflates reason 
with technocratic rationality and loss of meaning. Chronicling 
the historical process by which the rationalized worldview of 
Puritans came to dominate modern society, Weber describes an 
“iron cage” of Fordist production and bureaucratic rationality.
The Puritan wanted to work in a calling; we are forced to do 
so. For when asceticism was carried out of monastic cells into 
everyday life, and began to dominate worldly morality, it did 
its part in building the tremendous cosmos of the modern 
economic order. This order is now bound to the technical and 
economic conditions of machine production which to-day de‐
termine the lives of all the individuals who are born into this 
mechanism, not only those directly concerned with economic 
acquisition, with irresistible force. (1930, p. 181)
Chiefly, Habermas takes issue with Weber’s gloomy conclusion: 
that rationalization means an iron cage from which there is no 
escape. He also admonishes Weber for failing to demonstrate 
how Western rationality can be seen as universal. In practice, 
Habermas introduces his own notions of rationalization, insist‐
ing that the imperatives of “functionalist systems maintenance” 
rather than “instrumental reason gone wild” are more to ac‐
count for the particular ways rationalized values get superim‐
posed onto peoples’ psyches and wills. Habermas’ notions of 
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social evolution through system and lifeworld will further ex‐
plicate his critiques of Durkheim, Mead, Marx, and Weber. 
System and Lifeworld
 In Volume II of the Theory of Communicative Action, Habermas 
describes the fundamental problem of social theory with which 
theorists have been grappling since Marx: “…how to connect 
in a satisfactory way the two conceptual strategies indicated 
by the notions of ‘system’ and ‘lifeworld’” (1987, p. 151). In this 
quote, Habermas is suggesting that a theory of society which 
fails to appreciate both material and symbolic reproduction, 
and indeed structure and agency, is fundamentally constrained 
in its explanatory power. 
 The lifeworld, in Habermas’ view, “preserves and trans‐
mits the interpretive work of preceding generations. It forms 
the symbolic space…within which cultural tradition, social in‐
tegration, and personal identity are sustained and reproduced” 
(Thompson, 1983, p. 285). In contrast, the systems which main‐
tain society and reproduce its “material substrata” are collec‐
tively known as “the system.” The internal logic of the system 
is calculated self-interest, power, and profit. By contrast, the 
lifeworld is the realm of day-to-day life apart from the narrow 
interests of organizations and institutions. It is the realm of lan‐
guage and meaning; identity and embodiment; love, sensuality, 
and altruism; and social and cultural values. 
 David Ingram (1987) explains that the lifeworld is divided 
into private and public sectors. The nuclear family, in Haber‐
mas’s thinking, serves an important function with regard to so‐
cialization and intimacy and makes up the core of the private 
sector. The public sector includes a “network of cultural insti‐
tutions in which public opinion is shaped and social identity 
cultivated” (pp. 149–150). Importantly, the public sector of the 
lifeworld fosters “social dialogue necessary for generating the 
shared values and interests that undergird social integration” 
(1987, pp. 149–150). 
 Before going further, it is necessary to acknowledge crit‐
icism of this heuristic bifurcation in Habermas’ thinking. 
Feminist political theorists (e.g., Fraser, 1990) have questioned 
the masculinist idealization of bourgeois public sphere in 
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Habermas’ system/lifeworld dichotomy. Others (Ingram, 1987) 
have pointed out the deeply problematic reinscription of a 
widely discredited public/private split which effectively ignores 
the profoundly gendered and material functions of the family 
and at the same time underestimates the symbolic reproductive 
functions of employers in the paid segment of the labor force. 
Ingram provides a distinction that is helpful in considering the 
ideas of system and lifeworld: “It might be best, then, to think of 
lifeworld and system as relating to logically distinct functions 
that overlap within institutions” (1987, p. 116). This corrective 
allows us to theorize the conjoined aspects of carework and do‐
mestic labor, for example, as both intimate and economic, per‐
sonal and political.
 Perhaps the pivotal idea on which the system and lifeworld 
distinction turns is something Habermas refers to as “colonization 
of the lifeworld.” It is the recognition that the lifeworld cannot be 
conceptualized exclusively in instrumentally rational terms with‐
out grave, socially “pathological consequences.” When the sys‐
tem oversteps its “mediating roles and penetrate[s] those spheres 
of the lifeworld which are responsible for cultural transmission,” 
(Ingram, 1987, p. 385) inner colonization, or rationalization, of the 
lifeworld results. Writes Habermas, “Deformations of the lifeworld 
take the form of reification of communicative relations.” He goes 
on to describe the consequences: “Spheres of action of employees 
and of consumers, of citizens, and of clients of state bureaucracies” 
become thoroughly monetarized and bureaucratized (1987, p. 386). 
This is the pathological condition of technocratic domination in 
late modern society, a phenomenon which has been described 
elsewhere as neoliberalism. 
 Take, for example, the striking parallels between coloniza‐
tion of the lifeworld and Brown’s (2005) description of neoliber‐
al rationality, which is worth quoting at length:
Neoliberal rationality, while foregrounding the market, is not 
only or even primarily focused on the economy; it involves 
extending and disseminating market values to all institu‐
tions and social action, even as the market itself remains a 
distinctive player…The political sphere, along with every 
other dimension of contemporary existence, is submitted to 
an economic rationality; or, put the other way around, not 
only is the human being configured exhaustively as homo 
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œconomicus, but all dimensions of human life are cast in terms 
of a market rationality. (p. 40)
The crucial distinction between the account of monetarization 
and bureaucratization offered by Brown, which relies on Fou‐
cault’s idea of governmentality, versus the account offered by 
Habermas, which posits colonization of the lifeworld, is the 
submerged element of agency. 
 Brown goes on to describe the way in which neoliberal 
governmentality subjects “every action and policy to consid‐
erations of profitability…conducted according to a calculus of 
utility, benefit, or satisfaction against a microeconomic grid of 
scarcity, supply and demand, and moral value-neutrality” (p. 
40). By contrast, Habermas is quick to point out that while class 
conflict has been institutionalized in late modernity and classes 
mollified, his notion of system and lifeworld actually predicts 
“new” antagonisms not organized along class lines:
The fact that in welfare state mass democracies class con‐
flict has been institutionalized and thereby pacified does not 
mean that protest potential has been altogether put to rest. 
But the potentials for protest emerge now along different lines 
of conflict—just where we would expect them to emerge if the 
thesis of the colonization of the lifeworld were correct…The 
new problems have to do with quality of life, equal rights, 
individual self-realization, participation, and human rights. 
(1987, p. 392)
 While not entirely autonomous, the lifeworld, as a concept, 
contains the nucleus of potential political action. It allows subjects 
a measure of sovereignty, a kind of counter-rationality against 
the relentless economization and bureaucratization of life. While 
Habermas’ notion of the lifeworld is admittedly too unified, ide‐
alized, and binarized, it nonetheless provides an epistemologi‐
cal archipelago, not unlike a collective “self-observing ego” or a 
political “wise mind.” Through communicative action, the next 
topic of this essay, publics can theoretically consolidate and pro‐
mote shared values generated within the lifeworld—values like 
love, justice, and care—and mobilize these ethics to oppose the 
colonization of the lifeworld by the system. 
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Critical Consciousness and Communicative Action
 Embedded in Habermas’ idea of the rationalization of the 
lifeworld is the concept of communicative action. Through legiti-
mation crisis, in which publics lose confidence in leaders, insti‐
tutions, or administrative functions, rational subjects become 
aware of, or “thematize” their location within problematic social 
relations and display their opposition by organizing and pro‐
testing politically or by otherwise expressing their discontent. 
According to Habermas, through reason and communication—
that is, self-reflexivity and engagement in public discourse—late 
modern subjects can and do defy the full colonization of the 
lifeworld. In the U.S., recent examples include mass protest of 
the Trump administration’s travel ban on Muslim countries; lo‐
cal, state, and federal opposition and outright refusal to enact 
draconian immigration and healthcare policies; the largest one-
day public demonstration in the history of the U.S. in the wom‐
en’s march; and recent groundbreaking elections of women and 
people of color in the 2018 mid-term elections.
 Returning for a moment to classical Marxist thought, we see 
that Habermas differs appreciably from Marx in his emphasis on 
both symbolic and material production. This allows Habermas 
to make sense of social movements organized along the lines of 
identity rather than class-based antagonism, as social movements 
which are not labor-based—and thus system-based—arise in resis‐
tance to the system domination of the lifeworld but along different 
vectors of oppression than those conceptualized by Marx. 
 Moreover, recently thematized arenas of concern make vis‐
ible problematic social relations which were tacitly condoned 
by an orthodox Marxist embrace of positivism in promoting 
“scientific socialism.” These include indigenous communities’ 
environmental resistance to continuing expropriation of land 
by the oil industry; radical intellectual disability scholarship 
that embraces the notion of “animacy” for people labelled with 
intellectual disability (Chen, 2012); and queer and transgender 
erosion of a stubbornly persistent gender binary. In recogniz‐
ing the liberatory potential of crises of legitimation organized 
around identity and group-based rights, Habermas is more 
closely aligned with Marcuse’s theory of one dimensionality, 
which I will now review briefly so as to delineate the contours 
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of Habermas’ arguments. In the final section of the paper, I will 
consider the potential of Habermas’ thinking for social work.
Marcuse and One Dimensional Man
 Akin to Habermas’ inner colonization of the lifeworld is 
Marcuse’s theory of one-dimensionality. Marcuse, who fled 
Nazi Germany and engaged in anti-fascist work in the U.S. 
from 1942 until the early 1950s, held that in the advanced in‐
dustrial societies of the mid-twentieth century, “a comfortable, 
smooth, reasonable, democratic unfreedom prevails…a token of 
technical progress” (Marcuse, 1964, p. 1). In such a society, and 
owing to the seemingly neutral operationalization of the sci‐
entific method, needs become homogenized to such an extent 
that people are unaware that they are unhappy with structures 
of wealth inequality and corporate dominance, for example. 
Moreover, technological rationality and mass production work 
to contain antagonisms by appropriating any revolutionary ten‐
dencies that might arise. Thus, little difference exists between 
the quantitative dimensions of life (the system in Habermas’ 
thinking) and sensual satisfaction (an element of the lifeworld). 
 According to Marcuse, modern forms of social organization, 
in creating and meeting the material needs of the populous, rob 
people of the capacity for critical theorizing and constrain the 
“negative dialectic.” “Independence of thought, autonomy, and 
the right to political opposition are being deprived of their basic 
critical function in a society which seems increasingly capable 
of satisfying the needs of individuals through the way in which 
it is organized” (1964, p. 1). Through the rationalization of all 
spheres of life, only the given, “objectively” determined reality 
exists. Thus, subjects are stripped of their subjectivity. Knowl‐
edge of oneself as part of a political and economic structure, 
and as an object of positivist science, is collapsed. 
 According to Marcuse, in late modernity, certain features of 
late industrial society—centralized economic planning, the au‐
tomization of labor, the bureaucratization of all spheres of life, 
and the standardization and mass production of the culture 
industry—all combine to subdue citizen protest. “With the in‐
creasing concentration and effectiveness of economic, political, 
and cultural controls, the opposition in all these fields has been 
76 Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare
pacified, co-ordinated, or liquidated” (1964, p. xxiv). People be‐
come one-dimensional, incapable of self-reflection and thus in‐
capable of instigating meaningful social change.
 Among critical theorists, Marcuse may be read as generally 
more resigned to the notion of pervasive false consciousness, 
which he refers to as “happy consciousness,” a thin veil of pseu‐
do-contentment which conceals deeper class unrest and poten‐
tial political rupture. Updating Marcuse’s work from the 1950s, 
advisedly, we might say late modern subjects under the reign of 
corporate oligarchy have become time-fixated, sound-bite sat‐
urated, socially media(ted) consumers who document life in a 
series of selfies and Tweets, between increasingly long and in‐
trusive hours of work. Preoccupied by Facebook, Snapchat, and 
Instagram, they pose only insignificant threats to the social or‐
der, so consumed are they with economic survival after decades 
of declining real wages and ever widening economic inequality 
(Reich, 2010). Self-celebration through social media is the new 
token economy in which the promise of “going viral” serves to 
quell outright political and economic unrest.
 Despite pessimism about the persistence of false conscious‐
ness, Marcuse is somewhat more optimistic about liberation 
through what he calls “non-repressive desublimation,” the pro‐
cess by which modern subjects forge a critical dialectic that in‐
terrogates the one-dimensional conformity of consumption and 
repression. Just as Freud postulated that sublimation allowed 
civilization to exist by siphoning off libidinal and aggressive 
impulses through creative and philosophic expression, Mar‐
cuse holds that “autonomous art,” which was imbued with a 
critical sensibility toward conformity, could unfetter the politi‐
cal libido of 1950s America. 
 While Marcuse posits “the Great Refusal” of the status quo 
through avant garde or “autonomous” art, Habermas believes 
that a new consciousness can arise from a new form of action 
which is not fundamentally instrumental and rational. Through 
communicative action, publics can critically evaluate the deleteri‐
ous effects of modernity while retaining certain beneficial ele‐
ments of rationality, but a form of rationality that is based in the 
sensual embodied and daily experience of the lifeworld—not 
altogether different from Marcuse’s embrace of desire as the ba‐
sis of art. Marcuse concludes One-Dimensional Man (1964) with a 
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call to discard false consciousness through the embrace of rea‐
son not unlike the reason embraced by Habermas in his theory 
of communicative action. Both essentially call on citizens to em‐
brace “Reason…[which] promote[s] the Art of life.” In short, like 
Habermas and other critical theorists, Marcuse urges the devel‐
opmental of a new kind of reason not conflated with the delete‐
rious effects of technological rationality, but rather, with critical 
thinking and ultimate liberation. This is the sort of thinking I 
believe we need, pressingly, in social work.
Habermas’s Contribution to Social Work
 Thus far in this essay, I have reviewed three central Haberm‐
sian ideas: system and lifeworld, legitimation crisis, and com‐
municative action. I will now apply these concepts to social 
work and suggest, provisionally and advisedly, how social work 
as a project and social workers as citizen-workers can: (1) resist 
the technicization of social work practice, policy, and research; 
(2) democratize citizen/clients by leveraging legitimation crises; 
and (3) catalyze communicative action in communities. 
Colonization of the Lifeworld by the System, Redux 
 To understand the technicization of social work, we must 
review Habermas’ idea of the colonization of the lifeworld by 
the system. Habermas conceives “of societies simultaneously as 
systems and lifeworlds” (Habermas, 1989a, p. 118). Let us first 
discuss the lifeworld. 
 The Lifeworld. Borrowing from Husserl, Habermas describes 
the lifeworld as the social “horizon within which communica‐
tive actions are ‘always already’ moving” (Habermas, 1987, p. 
119). He says that “language and culture are constitutive for the 
lifeworld itself” (Habermas, 1987, p. 125) and goes on to describe 
the ways in which lifeworlds shape and are shaped by social 
actors in a dialectical feedback loop of structure and agency. 
 Like poststructuralists, Habermas recognizes that language/
culture does not merely reflect reality but actively constitutes it. 
Perhaps he would even agree with the poststructuralist insight 
that language is a series of arbitrary signs and signifiers with no 
transcendental signified. That is to say that within sign/signifier 
78 Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare
pairs, there can never be a stable or fixed meaning with which 
all human subjects would agree. Indeed, there remains the 
possibility that a given connotation will be appropriated and 
re-inflected to serve a political or economic interest. For example, 
social justice cleaves consistently to no intrinsic political essence. 
One has only to search YouTube to find video after video featur‐
ing the right wing insult du jour, social justice warrior, aimed at 
sanctimonious progressives. 
 The mechanics of meaning aside, in focusing not on the text 
that is produced but rather, on its production, Habermas underscores 
the importance of praxis. He posits that the activity of communi-
cating, which requires modern subjects to referee reality literal‐
ly hundreds of times each day, is the very basis of consensus in 
democracy. Within a functioning, robust lifeworld, publics can 
negotiate an acceptable working version of consensus. In short, 
they can govern themselves: 
The structures of the lifeworld lay down the forms of the in‐
tersubjectivity of possible understanding. The lifeworld is, so 
to speak, the transcendental site where speaker and hearer 
meet, where they can reciprocally raise claims that their ut‐
terances fit the world (objective, social, and subjective), and 
where they can criticize and confirm those validity claims, 
settle their disagreements, and arrive at agreements. (Haber‐
mas, 1987, p. 126)
Habermas does not succumb to postmodern skepticism about 
modern subjects’ abilities to articulate shared human values. 
In a post-truth epoch, this belief seems almost radical. Indeed, 
according to Habermas, the challenge to lifeworlds is not that 
posed by the displacement of the grand narratives of truth, jus‐
tice, and freedom under postmodernism. Rather, it is the chal‐
lenge of regulating society through markets and bureaucracies, 
to which we now turn.
 The System. As lifeworlds grow more complex, they enlist 
“steering media” to organize their day-to-day functions. These 
steering media, notably money and power in post-agrarian so‐
cieties, are enlisted to coordinate political and economic activi‐
ty and comprise the system in Habermas’ thinking. The system 
holds “a purposive-rational attitude toward calculable amounts 
of value…while bypassing processes of consensus-oriented 
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communication” (Habermas,1987, p. 183). Unlike the lifeworld, 
the system is not governed by consensus. In fact, Habermas 
contends that the twin logics of marketization and bureaucrati‐
zation actively undermine democratic consensus:
Between capitalism and democracy there is an indissoluble 
tension; in them two opposed principles of societal integra‐
tion compete for primacy. If we look at the self-understand‐
ing expressed in the basic principles of democratic constitu‐
tions, modern societies assert the primacy of a lifeworld in 
relation to the subsystems separated out of its institutional 
orders…On the other hand…the propelling mechanism of 
the economic system has to be kept as free as possible from 
lifeworld restrictions…The internal systemic logic of capital‐
ism [is that its needs will be met], if need be, even at the cost 
of technicizing the lifeworld. (Habermas, 1987, p. 345)
“Technicization” of the lifeworld is what Habermas means 
when he refers to its “colonization,” a state that occurs when 
“the imperatives of autonomous subsystems” (bureaucracies 
and markets) “make their way into the lifeworld from the out‐
side—like colonial masters coming into a tribal society” and 
forcing “assimilation” (Habermas, 1987, p. 355). Under the reign 
of technicization, human interactions and activities are sub‐
mitted to a thoroughgoing assessment of their efficiency and 
effectiveness. In social life, a means-ends rationality subsumes 
considerations based on kindness, love, fairness, or altruism. 
Resisting Technicization: Implications for Social Work
 Applied to organizations and sub-systems which comprise 
the social work field (e.g., welfare, child welfare, health, mental 
health, justice, disability, education), the consequences of tech‐
nicization, or colonization, are grim. In this circumstance, “Ef‐
ficiency overrides all other values, such as justice, honesty, fair‐
ness, and mutual consent” (Bausch, 1997, p. 323). The people who 
work within these systems “lack vitality in their lifeworlds…lose 
contact with their cultural traditions…lack a sense of personal 
and social meaning…[and] feel ineffective.” In short, they be‐
come Weber’s (1930) iron cage bureaucrats: “specialists without 
spirit” and “sensualists without heart” (Bausch, 1997, p. 323). 
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 In Figure 1, I suggest heuristic applications of these ideas 
to social work practice, policy, and research. These are by no 
means exhaustive and are open to interpretation, reinvention, 
and improvement. However, to resist technicization of the life‐
world, social work might embrace the following four principles: 
critical praxis, values-based decisionmaking, global cooperation, and 
systems humanization. By critical praxis, I mean an orientation to 
social work guided by critical theory in which social work prac‐
titioners and researchers “seek to produce practical, pragmatic 
knowledge that is cultural and structural, judged by its degree 
of historical situatedness and its ability to produce praxis or ac‐
tion” (Denzin & Lincoln, 2000, p. 160). 
 By values-based decisionmaking, I am suggesting that social 
work practitioners and scholars scrutinize the seductions of this 
particular moment, like faith in scientific or actuarial certainty. 
This includes a broad range of considerations: regarding neuroim‐
aging as the most promising approach to mental health research; 
to the ubiquitous rankings and ratings of schools, programs, and 
scholars; to the pervasive seductions of criminalization, profes‐
sionalization, and neoliberal marketization (Mehrotra et al., 2016). 
 As a hedge on policy and practice insularity, I maintain that 
U.S. social work should continue to nurture meaningful global 
collaborations and explicitly support historical and comparative 
research. Finally, I suggest that social work should promote an 
ethic of care in its systems and institutions. This would require 
high quality supervision and mass resistance to Fordist-derived 
production principles applied to human need. Following are 
more in-depth examples of these activities.
 Reading across the first row, if social work adopted a critical 
praxis perspective, one practice implication is the use of decolo‐
nizing or anti-oppressive practice (AOP) frameworks. Anti-op‐
pressive practice is “a social justice-based, anti-discriminatory 
approach to social work in the United Kingdom, Canada, Aus‐
tralia, New Zealand, and other European countries” not yet 
widely adopted in the U.S. (Morgaine & Capous-Desyllas, 2015, 
p. 24). Informed by feminist, queer, anti-racist and other critical 
theoretical traditions that attend to the distribution of power 
in societies, AOP “addresses social divisions and structural in‐
equalities in the work that is done with people whether they be 
users (‘clients’) or workers” (Dominelli, 1996, p. 170). 
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 Although anti-oppressive and decolonizing frameworks 
invite scrutiny of micro-focused interventions rooted in indi‐
vidualizing biomedical formulations that are exclusively pre‐
mised on positivist ideals, they do not entrain a reflexive rejec‐
tion of evidence-based practice. Rather, clinical social workers 
practicing from an anti-oppressive practice stance, for example, 
could make an explicit commitment to select therapeutic inter‐
ventions with demonstrated effectiveness among marginalized 
and historically underrepresented service users. For example, 
when serving Asian men, who contend with high rates of men‐
tal health stigma (Livingston et al., 2018) and treatment dispari‐
ties (Abe Kim et al., 2007), social workers might adopt the fourth 
wave CBT Acceptance and Commitment Therapy, which has shown 
promise of cultural relevance and treatment efficacy with this 
group (Nagayama Hall, Hong, Zane, & Meyer, 2011). 
 In the policy arena, social workers would center meaning‐
ful efforts to eradicate economic inequality. After a half century 
of social science research, we know that poverty and economic 
inequality, much of it due to ongoing colonial and carceral 
Figure 1: How Social Work Can Resist Technicization
82 Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare
processes like slavery and settler colonialism, are at the root of 
health disparities, child maltreatment rates, and educational 
disparities (Gil, 2013), to name just a few sequelae of an econom‐
ic order buttressed by the gendered and racialized maldistri‐
bution of resources. A critical praxis approach to policy would 
resist the liberal welfare state status quo in which structural in‐
equalities are displaced onto individuals through stigmatizing, 
pathologizing practices (Bryson, 2016).
 Finally, if social work embraced critical praxis, it would 
seek interdisciplinary collaboration as a way to interrogate tak‐
en-for-granted conceptions of health, violence, and disability, 
for example. Engagement with other disciplines, especially 
newly emerging disciplines like critical disability, could trouble 
some of social work’s assumptions about psychiatric disabili‐
ty and neurodiversity, which are reinscribed in current social 
work scholarship/research, pedagogy, and accreditation stan‐
dards around professional suitability, sensory capacities in the 
classroom, and social/interpersonal skills. 
 Reading down the first column of Figure 1, resisting tech‐
nicization of social work practice would invite us to question the 
scientific certainty of this era’s scientific truths like biomedical‐
ization, neuropsychiatry, psychopharmacology, actuarial risk 
assessment, and genetic engineering. As mentioned, we would 
“challenge the notion that the solutions reside solely in the state 
or the science” (Mehrotra et al., 2016, p. 159).
 Continuing down the first column, in keeping with a desire 
to support user-directed initiatives and actions, we might forthright‐
ly acknowledge that all social work relationships are embedded 
in a complex web of intersectional and structural realities that 
profoundly able-ize, racialize, normalize, and class and gender 
the intersubjective space between social worker and citizen. Us‐
ing Habermasian insights about the lifeworld, we could iden‐
tify and subvert those discursive and institutional practices 
that monetize and financialize every aspect of our and service 
users’ waking and sleeping hours. As a profession, we would 
refuse the colonial logic of the inquisition in our dealings with 
service users and work to dismantle institutional processes of 
surveillance in favor of co-constructing rather than extracting 
narratives deployed to gain access to services or resources.
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 Finally, as professionals, we might engage in reflexive supervi-
sion and forego our preoccupation with professional conventions, 
often borrowed from professions like psychiatry, psychology, 
and public health, which embody no particular commitment to 
social justice nor to fundamental social change. We would per‐
haps begin to imagine, with uninhibited creativity, ways of being 
professional that do not reinscribe a subject-object split between 
ourselves and service users. 
Democratizing Citizen/clients by Leveraging Legitimation Crises 
 While I’ve hinted at the next implication of Habermasian 
thinking for social work, I wish to make explicit the need for so‐
cial work to appreciate the submerged or invisibilized citizen in 
every patient or client. If we take an example from the current 
moment, the Trump presidency represents the legitimation cri‐
sis of global neoliberalism and its turn toward regressive nation‐
alism. On the other hand, the Trump presidency has itself pro‐
duced a legitimation crisis across the globe, an unprecedented in 
vivo test of liberal democracy’s mettle. Evidence of legitimation 
crises can be found in public protest, among other things. 
 If we look solely at protest, the election of Donald Trump 
spawned the largest single-day mass protest (The Women’s 
March) in U.S. history, drawing somewhere between 3,267,134 
and 5,246,670 protesters, more than twice the entire combined 
U.S. military (Chenoweth & Pressman, 2017). Following Haber‐
mas’ logic, the self-reflexivity present in the lifeworld catalyzed 
this growing crisis of legitimation. In other words, given the 
link between the lifeworld and carework, paid and unpaid, it is 
not an accident that the largest march was a women’s march. 
The lifeworld sustains us, and at least on occasion, it resists 
ruthless and craven, rationalized and official misogyny. Wheth‐
er we can nourish ongoing protest remains an unanswered 
question of our era. 
 As for social work’s role in nourishing and protecting the 
lifeworld, Habermas is fairly unequivocal that welfare states 
“grant a degree of need gratification to capitalism’s underpriv‐
ileged” and in so doing, “make the capitalistic system secure 
amid the conditions of radical social inequality” (Bausch, 1997, 
p. 322). About the welfare state’s “clients,” Habermas writes, 
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“Clients are customers who enjoy the rewards of the welfare 
state; the client role is a companion piece that makes political 
participation that has been evaporated into an abstraction and 
robbed of its effectiveness acceptable” (1987, p. 350). 
 To counter the neutralization of the citizen role and the 
concurrent expansion of the client role in late modernity, so‐
cial work could incorporate social and political action into all 
encounters and social work interventions—not just community 
organizing or other macro-focused activities. Each time social 
work frames a problem in terms of individual responsibility or 
pathology, promotes the language of client/consumer, or fails to 
attend to the larger structural forces shaping people’s lives and 
the very worker-citizen relationship, it contributes to the evap‐
oration of political participation among the citizenry. If social 
work cannot resist biomedicalization, neoliberalization, and 
professionalization, how is it different from psychology, nurs‐
ing, or other health professions? 
 In her book on cultural citizenship and immigrant commu‐
nity identity development, Hye-Kyung Kang (2010) identifies 
multi-level interventions which encourage immigrant subjects 
to generate counter-discourses of citizenship by taking part in 
political action (along with traditional counseling, for example). 
The particular political action may vary. However, to resusci‐
tate liberal democracy, social work should examine the ways in 
which it unwittingly contributes, through naturalized profes‐
sional practices, to the denaturalization of citizens. 
Catalyzing Communicative Action
 Finally, I wish to consider the implications of communica‐
tive action for social work. In the Theory of Communicative Action, 
Habermas (1987) explains,
Communicative action relies on a cooperative process of 
interpretation in which participants relate simultaneous‐
ly to something in the objective, the social, and the subjec‐
tive worlds…Coming to an understanding [Verständigung] 
means that participants in communication reach an agree‐
ment [Einigung] concerning the validity of an utterance; 
agreement [Einverständnis] is the intersubjective recognition 
of the validity claim the speaker raises for it. (p. 120)
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 At few junctures in U.S. history has an electorate been so 
bitterly divided and so unwilling to grant the “validity of an ut‐
terance” to a person of the opposite political party. In my mind, 
this signals the need to attempt even potentially futile mac‐
rolevel efforts to bring together factions and publics to sustain 
reasoned dialogue. William Scheuerman offers an important 
apologetic for critics who have dismissed the Habermasian idea 
of communicative action as naïve with regard to power:
For Habermas, if we interpret democracy as a way of life 
where people make binding decisions based on arguments, 
we need to grasp how deliberation works, and how best to de‐
lineate reasonable and legitimate from unreasonable and il‐
legitimate public exchange. Real-life democracy hardly looks 
like the idealized communication community Habermas de‐
scribes. Yet absent some sense of that ideal community, we 
can neither distinguish manufactured from independent 
public opinion, nor deepen democracy. (2017, para. 13)
 If we consider the cadre of trained social workers, a legion 
of more than 649,300 communication technologists (Bureau of 
Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor, 2017), we immediate‐
ly see the potential for social workers to become leaders in the 
promotion of communicative rationality, citizen subjects, and 
political consensus, not just microlevel therapy and ongoing 
welfare state bureaucracy. One promising strategy is intergroup 
dialogue, “a public process designed to involve individuals and 
groups in an exploration of societal issues such as politics, rac‐
ism, religion, and culture that are often flashpoints for polar‐
ization and social conflict” (Dessel, Rogge, & Garlington (2006, 
p. 303). Dessel et al., conclude that while ongoing research is 
needed to establish the efficacy of intergroup dialogue in pro‐
moting behaviors and social change, existing “evidence appears 
sufficient to warrant social workers’ investment in exploring the 
approach” (2006, p. 306). 
 And here, I would push the implication of communicative 
action to its dialectic edge: Adopting an anti-oppressive practice 
stance is not enough. Arguing in agency or faculty meetings 
about how to decolonize social work or how best to center racial 
equity is certainly a beginning. However, for communicative 
action to repair fissures in the lifeworld, it must move beyond 
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rhetoric and beyond the academy. It must move away from a 
stance of “innocence” and toward engagement with family 
members, conservatives, and colleagues who are less “woke.” 
It must step into the void of democratic consensus and take up 
residence there, knitting communities together until they are 
familiar neighbors who remain in relationship despite perhaps 
fundamental and irreconcilable disagreement about the nature 
and function of the nation state, social entitlements, freedom, 
and power. 
Conclusion: Critical Theory in These Times
 In the conclusion to her essay on neoliberalism and the end 
of democracy, Wendy Brown (2005) calls for the Left to chal‐
lenge neoliberal governmentality “with an alternative vision of 
the good, one that rejects homo oeconomicus as the norm of the 
human” (p. 59). Her goals are modest but profound: “In its bar‐
est form, this would be a vision in which justice would center 
not on maximizing individual wealth or rights but on develop‐
ing and enhancing the capacity of citizens to share power and 
hence to collaboratively govern themselves” (p. 59). 
 In my mind, neoliberal governmentality provides the di‐
agnosis but not the cure and cannot meaningfully provide a 
vision of shared power or collective governance. Its main epis‐
temological foreclosure is that it relies on discourse, and, as 
we have seen, in Foucault’s formulation “it is discourse which 
produces human experience rather than experience … produc‐
ing discourse” (Elliot, 2009, p. 86). By contrast, and through my 
avowedly heuristic interpretation, the Habermasian notion of 
lifeworld reverses this prescription so that human experience 
becomes the ground of discourse. In this vision, political dis‐
course is inaugurated by lived, embodied, human actors whose 
deliberative democracy is enlivened by passion and logic, rea‐
son and emotion.
 In this essay, I have argued that revisiting critical theory in 
its original instance could move U.S. social work closer to an 
engagement with liberal democracy, whose prognosis and vital 
signs remain unstable at this time. The contributions of Jürgen 
Habermas and the Frankfurt School could inspire social work 
to embrace a version of reason in this historical moment which 
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challenges the means-ends calculus of late advanced capitalism 
and the unremitting monetarization and bureaucratization of 
work and life. In reclaiming the metaphoric potential of system 
and lifeworld, legitimation crisis, and communicative action, 
social work could seize opportunities for radical resistance at 
a moment in which the typically obfuscated state sanction of 
greed, avarice, and vice have been made legible to an entire 
globe. Finally, Habermas and the Frankfurt School could assist 
social work in its ongoing struggle to unite interpretation and 
empiricism and to emancipate the “critical soul of science” and 
the “scientific soul of criticism,” (Held, 1980, p. 250) which is 
perhaps the task of this modern century.
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